E. J. Lowe’un Ontolojisinde Özdeşlik ve Tür Kavramları

The problem of identity and persistence is one of the central problems of me-

taphysics. The focus here is on the criteria of identity that determine whether

any two things are numerically the same and on how objects persist through

change. E. J. Lowe, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysical

debate, addresses this problem comprehensively within his own ontology. Lowe

considers the standard accounts of identity to be problematic. In his view, there

are not different kinds of identity for different sorts of thing, but only different

criteria of identity. For Lowe, these criteria are not merely epistemic principles

but metaphysical-cum-semantic rules inherent in the meanings of sortal terms;

accordingly, any attempt to identify instances falling under sorts with different

criteria of identity is misguided.

On Lowe’s account, individuals cannot be understood without sortal concepts,

the diversity of what there is cannot be determined without individuals, and ne-

ither sorts nor individuals can be fully grasped without criteria of identity. These

interconnections find their resolution within Lowe’s four-category ontology. The

present study examines the place of identity within Lowe’s theory, the structure

of criteria of identity, and the relationship between identity and sortal concepts.

In doing so, it sets out Lowe’s arguments against P. T. Geach’s relative identity

thesis and the respects in which Lowe diverges from D. Wiggins, before turning

to the criticisms directed at Lowe by contemporary philosophers such as Arda

Denkel and Harold W. Noonan.